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The Supreme Court of India: An Empirical Overview of the
Institution
Aparna Chandra, William H.J. Hubbard, and Sital Kalantry†
The Indian Supreme Court has been called “the most powerful court in the
world” for its wide jurisdiction, its expansive understanding of its own powers,
and the billion plus people under its authority. Yet scholars and policy makers
have a very uneven picture of the court’s functioning: deep knowledge about the
more visible, “high-profile” cases but very little about more mundane, but far
more numerous and potentially equally important, decisions. This chapter aims
to address this imbalance with a rigorous, empirical account of the Court’s
decisions from 2010 to 2015. We use the most extensive original dataset of
Indian Supreme Court opinions yet created to provide a broad, quantitative
overview of the social identity of the litigants that approach the court, the types
of matters they bring to the court, the levels of success that different groups of
litigants have before the Court, and the opinion-writing patterns of the various
judges of the Supreme Court. This analysis provides foundational facts for the
study of the Court and its role in progressive social change.

I. INTRODUCTION
The Indian Supreme Court has been called “the most powerful court in the
world” for its wide jurisdiction, its expansive understanding of its own powers,
and the billion plus people under its authority.1 Yet, for an institution that
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See George Gadbois, Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 10 BANARAS LAW JOURNAL 1
(1974); V. R. KRISHNA IYER, OUR COURTS ON TRIAL 18 (1987). This assessment has been
widely echoed in subsequent academic works on the Indian Supreme Court. See e.g.,
Shylashri Shankar, India’s Judiciary: Imperium in Imperio?, in PAUL BRASS ED.,
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exercises immense public power and enjoys a high degree of legitimacy, no
broad account exists of who approaches the Court, for what purposes, and with
what levels of success.2 Both due to its fragmented bench structure (where
cases are usually decided by only two or three out of thirty-one judges) as well
as the large volume of cases, scholars and policy makers have a very uneven
picture of the court’s functioning: deep knowledge about the more visible,
“high-profile” cases, and near-absolute silence about more mundane, below the
radar, but often equally important, decisions.3
This imbalance is particularly relevant to the central question addressed
in this book: To what extent does (or can) the Supreme Court of India promote
progressive social change? Observers of the Court see the Court as selfconsciously seeking to give justice to the common person not only through highprofile cases asserting or expanding rights for the disadvantaged, but also by
exercising its discretionary jurisdiction to admit and decide each year
thousands of low-profile cases, usually involving individuals asserting
mundane legal claims.4 Thus, much of the current practice of the Court cannot
be understood simply by studying its landmark judgments. The Court devotes
the lion’s share of its energy to smaller cases, and these smaller cases are part
of its strategy of providing access to justice for the disadvantaged.
But is the Court succeeding in this aspect of its mission? The Indian
judiciary as a whole, and the Supreme Court in particular, has come under
increased attack for being unable to fulfill its mandate of providing access to
justice for the common person. Concerns about large backlogs, long delays, and
barriers to access have eroded the legitimacy of the judicial system and have
led to calls for systemic reforms. However, there is little consensus on the
nature of the judicial dysfunction, its causes, and paths to reform. While some
believe that the Supreme Court has witnessed a “docket explosion” which has
limited the Court’s ability to provide timely and just resolution of disputes,5
others argue that the core concern with the Court’s functioning is “docket
exclusion,” whereby the Court is increasingly accessible only for the rich and

ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF SOUTH ASIAN POLITICS 165 (2010); Alexander Fischer,
Higher Lawmaking as a Political Resource, in MIODRAG JOVANOVIĆ & KRISTIN
HENRARD EDS., SOVEREIGNTY AND DIVERSITY 186 (2008).
An initial effort to flesh out this picture was made in Nick Robinson, A Quantitative
Analysis of the Indian Supreme Court’s Workload, 10 JOURNAL OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUDIES 570 (2013) (using “the hodgepodge of data that is either publicly available or
that can be acquired from the Supreme Court”).
2

See generally Nick Robinson, Structure Matters: The Impact of Court Structure on the
Indian and U.S. Supreme Courts, 61 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW 101
(2013).
3

See Aparna Chandra, William H.J. Hubbard, and Sital Kalantry, The Supreme Court
of India: A People’s Court?, 1 INDIAN L. REV. 145 (2017).
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powerful.6 Both narratives—that of explosion and exclusion—agree, however,
that the Court is increasingly limited in its ability to achieve the lofty ideals of
providing succor and justice to “the butcher, the baker and the candle-stick
maker . . . the bonded labour and pavement dweller.”7
To address these concerns, various proposals for reforming the direction
and functioning of the Supreme Court have been advocated. These include
proposals to abolish two-judge benches;8 to set up special benches like the
recently established social justice bench;9 to set up regional benches;10 to
bifurcate the Court’s constitutional court function from its appellate court
function;11 and so on. However, in the absence of rigorous empirical study of
the Court, many of the current reform proposals are based on impressionistic
and anecdotal evidence of the Court’s functioning.
Little empirical data exists on the functioning of the Supreme Court. In the
early years of the Court George Gadbois undertook such an exercise.12 More
recently, Nicholas Robinson has provided empirical insights into the
functioning of the Court.13 The Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy has also begun
empirical studies of the Court.14 However, much remains to be done in mapping
the functioning of the Court.

G. Mohan Gopal, Justice and the Two Ideas of India, FRONTLINE, May 27, 2016
http://www.frontline.in/cover-story/justice-and-the-two-ideas-of-india/
article8581178.ece (accessed August 29, 2018).
6

7

Moti Ram v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1978) 4 SCC 47.

8

Abolish Two Judge Benches: Fali Nariman, INDIAN EXPRESS, April 10, 2014.

See Masoodi, Ashwaq, and Monalisa, Supreme Court sets up social justice bench, LIVE
4, 2014) (describing notice issued by the Supreme Court on establishing the
social justice bench); Utkarsh Anand, Allocate more time to Social Justice Bench, say
experts, INDIAN EXPRESS, December 13, 2014.
9

MINT (Dec.

See Law Commission of India, 229th Law Commission Report, Indiankanoon
(August 2009), https://indiankanoon.org/doc/24442307/ (accessed August 29, 2018).
10
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George H. Gadbois, Jr., The Supreme Court of India: A Preliminary Report of an
Empirical Study, 4 J. CONST. & PARLIAMENTARY STUD. 34 (1970). Nonetheless, several
authors have used empirical data generated largely by the Court itself to identify
trends and the workings of the Court. Rajiv Dhavan used data extensively to observe
the litigation explosion in Indian courts. See, e.g., RAJEEV DHAVAN, LITIGATION
EXPLOSION IN INDIA 60–61 (1986). In 1965, these cases were 60% of admitted cases and
it 1982, they were 42% of admitted cases. Id. at 83.
12

See, e.g., Nick Robinson, A Court Adrift, FRONTLINE, May 3, 2013,
http://www.frontline.in/cover-story/a-court-adrift/article4613892.ece (accessed August
30, 2018).
13

See, e.g., Alok Prasanna Kumar, Faiza Rahman & Ameen Jauhar, Vidhi Ctr. for
Legal Pol’y, Consultation Paper: The Supreme Court of India’s Burgeoning Backlog
Problem and Regional Disparities in Access to the Supreme Court (2015),
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/551ea026e4b0adba21a8f9df/t/560cf7d4e4b0920
14
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In this paper, we provide a descriptive account of the functioning of the
Court through an empirical analysis of all cases decided by the Supreme Court
between 2010–2015. The objective of this paper is to understand the social
identity of the litigants that approach the court, the types of matter they bring
to the court, the levels of success that different groups of litigants have before
the Court, and the decision patterns of the various judges of the Supreme
Court. Our approach is quantitative and comprehensive, based on a dataset of
information drawn from all judgments rendered by the Supreme Court during
the years from 2010 through 2015. Our dataset contains information on
judgments in over 6000 cases, decided in over 5000 published opinions issued
during this time period. Each of the Court’s opinions was hand-coded for
information on a wide range of variables, allowing us to compile the largest
and most detailed dataset on the Court’s judgments ever collected.
This data provides information about all of the cases decided by Supreme
Court judgments during this period (as reported in the Supreme Court Cases
reporter), including facts about the parties before the Court, where the cases
arose, what claims are at issue, what kind of legal representation the parties
have, how the Court hears the cases and how long the Court takes to decide,
who wins, and which justices write the opinions of the Court. In this chapter,
we summarize this treasure trove of information with the goal of establishing
a set of basic facts about the Court. These facts, we hope, will prompt new
research questions and inform existing descriptive and normative debates
about the role of the Court in promoting progressive social change. At the very
least, this chapter provides a foundation of empirically grounded background
facts to inform and contextualize the chapters in this volume.
In the sections that follow, we provide a brief background on the Supreme
Court of India and a description of the creation of our dataset before presenting
our findings. While the aspiration of this chapter is descriptive, not normative,
we offer in a short, concluding section some initial thoughts about potential
implications of the findings we report.
II. BACKGROUND ON THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
The Indian Supreme Court is the apex court for the largest common law
judicial system in the world. Set up in 1950 under the Constitution of India,
the Court began its existence with 8 judges. Over the years, the Court has
changed dramatically in size and structure. At present it has 31 seats.15 It
entertains over 60,000 appeals and petitions16 and issues approximately 1,000

10fff89b1/1443690452706/29092015_Consultation+Paper+on+the+Supreme+Court%
27s+Burgeoning+Backlog+Problem.pdf (accessed August 30, 2018).
15

INDIA CONST. art. 124, § 1.

16

Supreme Court of India, ANNUAL REPORT 2014, at 79.
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judgments per year.17 Court rules do not require judges to sit en banc. Judges
ordinarily sit in benches of 2 or 3, and sometimes—increasingly rarely—in
larger benches.18 Decisions of all benches of the Court are binding on all lower
courts within the territory of India.19
Judges of the Court are technically appointed by the President in
“consultation” with Chief Justice of India.20 In practice, as a result of judicial
interpretations, appointments to the Court are made by a “collegium” of the
senior-most judges of the Court, who choose the Court’s new members.21
Appointees tend to be senior judges, often chief justices, from the high courts.22
Judges of the Supreme Court must retire at 65 years of age.23 Consequently,
most judges serve on the Supreme Court for short durations, and generally for
not more than five years.24 In its 68 years of existence, more than 230 judges
have served on the Court.25 The Chief Justice of India is the senior most judge
of the Supreme Court as measured by the date s/he was appointed to the
Court.26
The Supreme Court has broad jurisdiction. It performs a dual function: as
a court of original jurisdiction on certain matters such as those relating to the
enforcement of fundamental rights; 27 and as a final court of appeals against
decisions and orders passed by subordinate courts and tribunals.

JUDIS, the official e-reporter of the Supreme Court of India records 900 judgments
for 2014.
17

Nick Robinson et al., Interpreting the Constitution: Supreme Court Constitution
Benches since Independence, 46 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 27, 28 (2011). (Finding that the
number of cases heard and disposed of by five judge benches has decreased from 15.5%
in the 1950s to 0.12% in the 2000s.) A single judge sits for “chamber matters”, a set of
designated procedural matters, such as bail applications pending appeal.
18

19

INDIA CONST. art. 141.

20

INDIA CONST. art. 124, § 2.

Special Reference No. 1 of 1998, (1998) 7 SCC 739; Supreme Court Advocates on
Record Ass’n v. Union of India, (1993) 4 SCC 441; S. P. Gupta v. Union of India, AIR
1982 SC 149.
21

The high courts are the next-highest courts to the Supreme Court in the hierarchy
of Indian court system.
22

23

INDIA CONST. art 124, § 2.

See T. R Andhyarujina, The Age of Judicial Reform, THE HINDU, Sept. 1, 2012,
http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/the-age-of-judicial-reform/article3845041.ece
(accessed August 30, 2018).
24

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, https://www.sci.gov.in (accessed August 30, 2018) (data
gathered from adding up the lists of sitting and retired justices).
25

See Abhinav Chandrachud, Supreme Court’s Seniority Norm: Historical Origins, 47
ECON. & POL. WKLY. 26, 26 (2012).
26

This is not the limit of the Court’s jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has original
jurisdiction with respect to inter-state disputes and over certain election matters.
27
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Article 32 of the Constitution guarantees the right to move the Supreme
Court for enforcement of fundamental rights. A distinctive component of this
jurisdiction is public interest litigation (“PIL”), a judicially created innovation
of the 1970s. Through PILs the Court reformulated standing rules to allow any
member of the public to seek relief from the Court on behalf of a person or
people whose fundamental rights had been violated but who could not, “by
reason of poverty, helplessness or disability or socially or economically
disadvantaged position,” come before the Court for relief themselves.28
The Court also has discretionary appellate jurisdiction over any order
passed by any court or tribunal across the country.29 A party seeking such
discretionary review files a Special Leave Petition (“SLP”). In recent years, on
average about 68,000 cases are filed annually before the Supreme Court,30
most of which are SLPs.
Apart from SLPs, the Court can also hear cases certified for appeal by high
courts.31 Further, many statutes provide for a statutory right to appeal to the
Court.32 Appeals as of right are defined by statute for certain claims heard by
lower courts and well as for review of decisions by specialized tribunals—
adjudicatory bodies separate from the Indian court system that resolve
statutory claims in specialized fields, such as electricity regulation, customs
and excise, or statutory consumer protection.
Cases filed before the Court are processed in two stages: an initial
admissions stage to decide which cases to admit for hearing; and a regular
(merits) hearing. Judges sit in benches of two every Monday and Friday to

INDIA CONST. art. 132 & 711. The President may also refer any matter to the Court for
its advisory (non-binding) opinion. INDIA CONST. art. 143.
S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 149. The Court’s own data reveals,
however, that even among cases admitted for merits hearing, PILs constitute only 1%
of the Court’s cases. Nick Robinson, A Quantitative Analysis of the Indian Supreme
Court’s Workload, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 570, 590, 598 (2013).
28

INDIA CONST. art. 136 (“Special leave to appeal by the Supreme Court. (1)
Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion,
grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or
order in any cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory
of India.”).
29

Supreme Court of India, ANNUAL REPORT 2014, at 76–79 (average of cases filed in
2010–14).
30

INDIA CONST. art. 132, 133, 134. Although the Court’s jurisdiction can be invoked
through procuring a certificate of appeal from the high court, this practice is rarely
used. One possible reason for the low use of the “Certificate of Appeal” jurisdiction is
that while ordinarily a petitioner has 90 days to file a SLP, the limitation for filing a
SLP after the high court has refused a certificate of appeal is 60 days. Some experts
suggested during interviews and interactions with us that lawyers do not invoke the
certificate of appeal process so as to give themselves more time to file in the Supreme
Court.
31

32

Supreme Court of India, ANNUAL REPORT 2014, at 59–63.
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decide which cases to hear.33 The admissions hearing is an ex parte proceeding,
and the Court denies most SLPs at the admissions stage. However, if the Court
is inclined to admit a case, it ordinarily does so only after issuing notice to the
other side to appear. A party can also preemptively file a “caveat” in the Court,
requesting that no petition be admitted in which it is a respondent without the
presence of such party. In such cases, a matter is listed for admission only after
notice is served to the other party. Very rarely does the Court admit a matter
ex parte. Of the matters in which notice is issued, the Court may dispose of the
matter at the admissions stage itself (called “final disposal” matters). In such
cases, after a brief hearing, if the Court admits the matter, it allows or denies
the SLP as part of the same order. Where the Court finds the need for a more
extensive hearing, the case is listed for a “regular” merits hearing.
III. DATA PROCESSING
Our study is based on a comprehensive dataset of all opinions of the Court
from 2010 to 2015, as published in the case reporter Supreme Court Cases
(SCC). The dataset contains 5699 judgments from 2010 to 2015 (dealing with
6857 cases).34 Our methodology for creating this dataset involved five roughly
sequential elements: (1) selection of source material for Court opinions; (2)
initial development of a template for hand-coding, and pilot testing, review,
and revision of the template; (3) comprehensive hand-coding of all cases within
the sample frame; (4) processing and quality control; and (5) creation of the
final database for analysis.
First, we selected SCC as the source material for our dataset because it is
the most cited reporter by and before the Supreme Court.35 Since SCC is a
private reporter, it is under no obligation to publish every decision given by the
Supreme Court. However, it is easily accessible, has extensive headnotes, and
unlike other reporters, records many details, including the names and
designations of lawyers involved.
We began our research by running a pilot of the project at Cornell Law
School. At this stage, students at Cornell Law School coded cases based on an
initial template. After review of the pilot effort, the template was overhauled.
To ensure internal consistency within the final dataset, we discarded the
results of the pilot coding phase.
We then assembled a team of nearly two-dozen students from National Law
University (“NLU”), Delhi, who then took up the task of coding cases. The team

Supreme Court of India, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: A HANDBOOK OF INFORMATION
35 (2010) (herein, “SC HANDBOOK”).
33

Cases that raise similar issues or revolve around the same facts are tagged and heard
together by the Court. Hence, one judgment may dispose of more than one case.
34

Rakesh Kumar Srivastava, A Guide to India’s Legal Research and Legal System,
GLOBALEX (April 2014), http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/india_legal_research.
htm#_10._Law_Reporting (Chief Librarian of the Supreme Court, stating that this
reporter is used around 60% of the time before the Supreme Court itself).
35

7
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3154597

read judicial opinions from the SCC Reporter and completed Excel templates.
The NLU, Delhi team hand-coded all cases reported in SCC in its volumes for
the years 2010 to 2015. Cases reported in these volumes that were decided
prior to 2010 were excluded from consideration. Each case was coded for 66
variables (although we do not discuss all coded variables below).
The team of coders at NLU, Delhi then worked with a team of researchers
at the University of Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics to
identify coding errors and variables that required recoding. This iterative
process involved statistical analysis of the coded data to identify
inconsistencies in coding patterns across variables. This primarily consisted of
items being entered inconsistently by coders, due to spelling errors or the use
of abbreviations by some coders but not others.36 These inconsistencies were
documented by the research team and corrected through an automated
recoding process to make codes consistent across cases.37
Finally, the cleaned and processed data was converted to the Stata
database format for statistical analysis. The dataset includes all Court
judgments from 2010 through 2015 that have been published in the SCC, with
the exception of orders from one-judge benches.38
IV. A QUANTITATIVE OVERVIEW OF THE COURT, 2010–2015
In this part, we present a series of descriptive analyses roughly
corresponding to the sequence of events in the life of a case decided by the
Court. In the sections below, we address, in sequence, the following topics: The
characteristics of the cases, including their subject matter, procedural history
and the time elapsed in the judicial process; characteristics of the litigants
bringing the cases, or being brought to court; characteristics of their attorneys;
characteristics of judges deciding these cases; and finally trends and patterns
of the decisions themselves. In our Conclusion, we provide tentative discussion
of potential implications of some of our empirical findings.
A. Case Characteristics
1. Subject Matter Categories
We begin by looking at the subject matter of the cases that the Court is
deciding. Table 1 shows the distribution of subject matters, using the

For most variables, such discrepancies were avoided through use of pre-filled dropdown menus that allowed coders to choose among multiple options. Some variables
needed to have an option for coders to enter unique text, however.
36

37

Computer code documenting these corrections is available upon request.

We excluded one-judge benches because they generally deal with procedural matters,
such as certain types of minor interim applications, which do not generate merits
judgments (although they occasionally generate orders that appear in SCC).
38
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categories employed by the Court itself.39 Criminal cases are the single largest
category, while civil cases are spread over 40 separate categories, none of which
consume the lion’s share of the Court’s attention. The largest category among
civil cases is “Service Matters,” which covers employment related disputes in
government service.
Note that Constitutional Matters comprise 5.3% of the entire output of the
judiciary, and PIL matters comprise an additional 3.1%. Thus, less than 10%
of the Court’s attention (as measured by number of cases) focuses on case
categories most associated with the protection of human rights and the
interests of the disadvantaged. Of course, while the volume of these cases is
relatively low, this says nothing about the time, effort and energy of the Court
that these matters take. Also, criminal matters, which disproportionately
affect the most vulnerable populations, make up a large share of the Court’s
output.

See SC HANDBOOK. However, the judgments themselves do not indicate under which
subject matter category the Court registry has placed individual cases. We have
therefore used the Court’s categories but categorized the cases ourselves.
39
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TABLE 1. SUBJECT MATTER CATEGORIES
Subject Matter Category
Criminal Matters
Service Matters
Ordinary Civil Matters
Land Acquisition & Requisition Matter
Constitutional Matters
Indirect Taxes Matters
Letter Petition & PIL Matters
Direct Taxes Matters
Compensation Matters
Family Law Matters
Matters Relating to Judiciary
Mercantile Laws, Commercial Transactions, etc.
Labour Matters
Arbitration Matters
Land Laws and Agricultural Tenancies
Environmental Matters
Contempt of Court Matters
Academic Matters
Appeal Against Orders of Statutory Body
Rent Act Matters
Election Matters
Matters Relating to Leases, Govt. Contracts, etc.
Matters Relating to Consumer Protection
Mines, Minerals and Mining Leases
Company Law, MRTP & Allied Matters
Admission/Transfer to Engineering and Medical Colleges
Matters Pertaining to Armed Forces
Admission to Educ. Inst. Other Than Med. & Eng’g
Establishment and Recognition of Educ. Inst.
Personal Law Matters
Simple Money & Mortgage Matters, etc.
Habeas Corpus Matters
Statutory Appointments
State Excise—Trading in Liquor
Religious & Charitable Endowments
Human Rights Matters
Admiralty and Maritime Laws
Reference Under Right to Information
Other (3 categories)
Total

10
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3154597

Share
29.1%
11.2%
10.4%
6.2%
5.3%
3.8%
3.1%
2.7%
2.6%
1.9%
1.9%
1.9%
1.8%
1.8%
1.5%
1.3%
1.3%
1.2%
1.2%
1.1%
1.1%
1.1%
1.0%
1.0%
0.8%
0.8%
0.6%
0.4%
0.4%
0.3%
0.3%
0.2%
0.2%
0.2%
0.2%
0.1%
0.1%
0.1%
0.0%
100.0%

2. Procedural history
Our data enables us to trace the procedural history of cases. Most cases
decided by the Court come to it as appeals from lower courts and tribunals.
Only about 12 percent of judgments are for proceedings within the Court’s
original (rather than appellate) jurisdiction. See Table 2.
TABLE 2. CASE ORIGINS: NATURE OF PROCEEDING
Variable

All

Appeal/SLP

Civil

Criminal

88.1%

86.2%

92.7%

Writ Petition

8.2%

9.7%

4.9%

Other Original Jurisdiction

3.2%

3.4%

2.0%

Review or Curative

0.6%

0.7%

0.4%

N

6850

4659

2174

Of those cases that came to the Court through appeal or special leave
petition (SLP), the vast majority (about 85 percent) came from courts rather
than tribunals. Interestingly, 6.2% of the appeals involved an interlocutory
appeal, that is, an appeal from an order other than the final decision of a court
below. See Table 3.
TABLE 3: CASE ORIGINS: SOURCE OF CASE
Variable

Count

Percent
of Total

N

Referred from Smaller
Bench

131

1.9%

6806

Originated in Court
Rather than Tribunal

5806

85.4%

6799

Interlocutory Appeal

428

6.2%

6854

Continuing Mandamus

383

5.7%

6724

Examining the cases coming up to the Supreme Court on appeal from high
courts, we find that high courts are unevenly represented in our dataset, with
over 600 cases from the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and no cases from
the High Court of Manipur or the High Court of Tripura (which may not be
surprising, since these courts were created only in 2013). See Table 4. These
patterns largely track what we might expect, based on factors such as the per
capita GDP of the states within the jurisdiction of each high court (See Figure
11
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1), the size of the various courts’ jurisdictions and their geographical proximity
to the Supreme Court.40
TABLE 4. CASE ORIGINS: HIGH COURT APPEALED FROM
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

High Court
High Court of Punjab & Haryana
High Court of Bombay
High Court of Delhi
High Court of Allahabad
High Court of Madras
High Court of Karnataka
High Court of Andhra Pradesh
High Court of Madhya Pradesh
High Court of Rajasthan
High Court of Calcutta
High Court of Kerala
High Court of Gujarat
High Court of Patna
High Court of Uttarakhand
High Court of Orissa
High Court of Gauhati
High Court of Jharkhand
High Court of Himachal Pradesh
High Court of Chhattisgarh
High Court of Jammu & Kashmir
High Court of Sikkim
High Court of Meghalaya
High Court of Manipur
High Court of Tripura
Total

Number
646
607
530
502
368
367
301
289
262
261
233
198
171
121
94
91
88
73
56
39
8
1
0
0
5306

Reversal
Rate (%)
62
56
55
54
60
61
59
64
62
60
49
61
64
63
73
54
65
56
65
44
75
62
0
0
59

FIGURE 1. TOTAL CASES DECIDED AND PER CAPITA GDP,
BY HIGH COURT JURISDICTION
[CUP: Please see attached file, figure1.png]

Robinson, A Quantitative Analysis of the Indian Supreme Court’s Workload, 10
JOURNAL OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES 570 (2013).
40
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3. Case Duration
Next, we examine how long the cases in our data took to reach judgment.
Litigation in India is notoriously slow. Our data allow us to quantify how long
cases remain pending in the Supreme Court before the Court hands down
judgment. See Table 5. On average, cases take about 10 years from filing in
the court of first instance to judgment in the Supreme Court. About one-third
of that time was spent in the Supreme Court itself.
The data also permit, to a limited extent, a comparison of case duration in
the Supreme Court, the high courts, and courts of first instance. For 170 cases,
we have detailed information on filing and judgment dates for all three levels
of the court system, which allows us to compare, for the very same cases, how
much time they spent in each level of the court system. Table 6 indicates that
on average, cases that travel all the way to the Supreme Court are likely to
take longer in the Supreme Court than in the lower courts, including the court
of first instance where the case was tried. Although a significant amount of
energy is devoted to resolving delays in the trial courts, our data indicates that
the problem is present throughout the system, and in fact may be more acute
in the higher levels of the judiciary.
TABLE 5. DATE AND DURATION
Variable

Mean

Median

Max

Min

N

Year Filed in Court of
First Instance

2002

2004

2015

1905

3937

Year Decided in Court
of First Instance

2003

2005

2014

1964

1381

Year of Decision
Appealed From

2008

2008

2015

1976

5500

Year Filed in Supreme
Court

2009

2010

2015

1968

6853

Year Decided by
Supreme Court

2012

2012

2015

2010

6856

Duration in Court of
First Instance (Days)

1466

858

9372

1

180

Duration in Court
Below (Days)

1784

987

16574

5

1278

Duration in Supreme
Court (Days)

1569

1296

12404

0

5461

13
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3154597

TABLE 6. CASES WITH COMPLETE DURATION DATA
Variable

Mean

Median

Max

Min

Duration in Court of First
Instance (Days)

1424

847

9372

0

Duration in Court Below (Days)

2082

880

11966

18

Duration in Supreme Court
(Days)

1456

1207

4372

30

Table 7 indicates that at the Supreme Court itself, civil and criminal cases
take on average approximately the same amount of time to be decided. Writ
petitions to the Court take longer—as is to be expected given that they court
has to hear the case afresh and cannot rely on case records from the courts
below. Interestingly, cases originating in tribunals take longer for disposal in
the Supreme Court as compared to cases originating in courts. One of the goals
behind setting up tribunals is to speed up the disposal of cases. If such cases
are likely to face long pendency in the Supreme Court, this purpose gets
defeated.
TABLE 7. DURATION (DAYS) IN THE SUPREME COURT, BY CASE TYPE
Variable

Mean

Median

Max

Min

N

Civil

1582

1212

12404

0

3440

Criminal

1533

1411.5

8993

0

1812

Constitutional Challenge

1610

1140.5

12404

0

194

Writ Petition

1937

1492.5

12404

81

34

Case Originated in Court

1541

1277.5

12404

0

4542

Case Originated in Tribunal

1721

1441

11078

0

909

Breaking down case durations by subject matters reveals wide variation in
the speed with which different types of cases are resolved by the Court. Table
8 shows that some (albeit small) categories of cases take upwards of 7 or 8
years on average, while others take much less. (Eight years is 2922 days, and
four years is 1461 days, so the category of Admiralty and Maritime cases
exceeds 8 years in duration on average, and twenty additional categories exceed
4 years duration in Supreme Court alone.) Only one category, habeas corpus,
averages resolution in less than one year.
14
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TABLE 8. AVERAGE DURATION (DAYS) IN THE SUPREME COURT, BY SUBJECT
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

Subject Matter Category
Admiralty and Maritime Laws
Religious & Charitable Endowments
Indirect Taxes Matters
State Excise—Trading in Liquor
Direct Taxes Matters
Land Acquisition & Requisition Matter
Land Laws and Agricultural Tenancies
Human Rights Matters
Family Law Matters
Matters Relating to Commissions of Enquiry
Matters Pertaining to Armed Forces
Labour Matters
Environmental Matters
Simple Money & Mortgage Matters, etc.
Contempt of Court Matters
Constitutional Matters
Mercantile Laws, Commercial Transactions, etc.
Criminal Matters
Matters Relating to Consumer Protection
Ordinary Civil Matters
Service Matters
Appeal Against Orders of Statutory Body
Arbitration Matters
Compensation Matters
Rent Act Matters
Company Law, MRTP & Allied Matters
Personal Law Matters
Mines, Minerals and Mining Leases
Letter Petition & PIL Matters
Academic Matters
Matters Relating to Judiciary
Matters Relating to Leases, Govt. Contracts, etc.
Establishment and Recognition of Educ. Inst.
Statutory Appointments
Election Matters
Admission to Educ. Inst. Other Than Med. and Eng’g
Eviction Under the Public Premises
Reference Under Right to Information
Admission/Transfer to Eng’g And Med. Colleges
Habeas Corpus Matters
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Duration
3050
2776
2261
2133
2116
2021
1990
1801
1796
1763
1691
1663
1651
1643
1610
1593
1546
1544
1526
1499
1469
1460
1450
1438
1378
1356
1343
1284
1280
1193
1188
1077
888
863
735
631
592
538
390
190

B. Litigant characteristics
Next, we consider the configuration of the parties in the cases in our data.
We use the terms plaintiffs and defendants to refer to the original status of
parties in the court of first instance. Plaintiffs and defendants are about evenly
represented among appellants.41 A large fraction of cases involves multiple
plaintiffs or multiple defendants (or both). To the extent that the lead plaintiff
or defendant is a natural person, parties are overwhelmingly male. (Only
16.8% of the plaintiffs are female and 9.1% of the defendants are women. Males
are a higher share of defendants than plaintiffs because in our data criminal
defendants are about 95 percent male.) See Table 9. Perhaps the most notable
statistics in Table 9, though, are the shares of all parties (including natural
persons, governments, and institutional entities such as corporations) who are
Indian. Unlike the United States Supreme Court, which like the United States
court system as a whole, entertains a substantial number of claims by or
against foreign parties, the Supreme Court of India appears to be a forum
almost exclusively engaged with disputes between Indian nationals.
TABLE 9. PLAINTIFFS AND DEFENDANTS: SUMMARY STATISTICS
Variable

Mean

N

Appellant is Plaintiff

46.3%

5894

More than One Plaintiff

38.2%

5892

More than One Defendant

55.9%

5890

Plaintiff is Male (among
Individual Plaintiffs)

83.2%

2756

Defendant is Male (among
Individual Defendants)

90.9%

2475

Plaintiff is Indian

99.7%

5888

Defendant is Indian

99.8%

5887

Focusing specifically on civil cases, the majority of plaintiffs are individuals
(i.e., natural persons), and government is the defendant more often than not.
Not surprisingly, then, the most common configuration of parties in our
dataset is an individual plaintiff versus a government defendant. See Table 10.

For simplicity, we use “appellant” to refer to the party who sought review in the
Supreme Court, regardless of whether by special leave petition or appeal.
41
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(We do not separately present results for criminal cases, where the
configuration is usually the government against an individual defendant.)
TABLE 10. PAIRINGS OF PARTIES IN CIVIL CASES, SHARES BY STATUS
Defendant
Plaintiff

Individual

Government

Institution

Individual

17.0%
(N=662)

32.9%
(N=1284)

11.6%
(N=453)

Government

4.4%
(N=172)

0.9%
(N=34)

3.4%
(N=131)

Institution

2.7%
(N=104)

20.1%
(N=783)

7.1%
(N=277)

Looking instead at the appellant/appellee relationship rather than the
plaintiff/defendant relationship, we find that individuals make up the largest
group of appellants in both the civil and criminal context. In criminal appeals
this implies that the vast majority of the Court’s criminal judgments involve
individuals appealing against conviction and/or sentence, rather than the state
appealing an acquittal. This data is consistent with the premise that Court
tends to take up the cause of the individual against corporations or the
government.
TABLE 11. APPELLANTS IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES
Share of Appellants

Civil Cases

Criminal Cases

Total

Individual

46.1%

84.9%

58.4%

Government

23.9%

10.9%

19.8%

Institution

30.0%

4.2%

21.8%

As Table 11 indicates, before the Supreme Court the Government is the
appellant in roughly 20% of the cases. Of these, service matters, tax matters
and criminal matters form the largest share of the cases that the government
brings to Court. See Table 12. Interestingly, in tax matters, the government
wins in only half the cases that the Court admits. This might indicate both
over-appealing by the Government, and relaxed admission scrutiny for such
cases by the Court. Paired with the finding in Table 11 above, that tax matters
take amongst the longest to dispose of, these statistics point to the need for the
Court and the Government to review their approach to tax litigation.
17
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3154597

TABLE 12. GOVERNMENT APPELLANTS, TOP SUBJECT MATTER AND REVERSAL
RATES
Rank

Subject Matter Category

Share

Reversal
Rate

1 Service Matters

19.2%

67.3%

2 Criminal Matters

17.3%

56.8%

3 Indirect Taxes Matters

10.8%

50.3%

4 Ordinary Civil Matters

8.9%

66.4%

5 Direct Taxes Matters

6.9%

48.4%

6 Land Acquisition & Requisition Matters

6.4%

74.1%

7 Constitutional Matters42

5.5%

100%

8 Academic Matters

2.3%

13.8%

9 Arbitration Matters

2.1%

65.5%

2.1%

72.4%

10 Appeal Against Orders of Statutory Body
C. Attorneys

There are two tiers in the Supreme Court bar in India: advocates and senior
advocates. “Senior advocate” is a status conferred upon an attorney the Court
itself. Senior advocates are an exclusive group. As of April 2015, there were
349 senior advocates designated by the Supreme Court of India,43 but these
lawyers obtain a great share of the advocacy work at the Court. As Table 13
indicates, advocates and senior advocates are about evenly represented in our
dataset, (with only a tiny number of unrepresented parties). In criminal cases,
most attorneys (for both sides) are advocates, while in civil cases, a majority
are senior advocates.

Note that the reversal rate for constitutional matters is 100% due to there being only
one observation with nonmissing information on reversal.
42

43List

of Senior Advocates Designated by Supreme Court (as on 23/04/2015), SUPREME
COURT OF INDIA, http://www.sci.nic.in/outtoday/List%20of%20Sr.%20Advocates%20
Designated%20by%20Supreme%20Court%20as%20on%2023%2004%202015.pdf
(accessed Aug. 30, 2016).
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TABLE 13. COUNSEL, BY PARTY AND CASE TYPE
Appellant
Counsel

Total

Criminal

Advocates

51.1%

64.0%

Senior
Advocates

47.5%

Other44
N

Respondent
Civil

Total

Criminal

Civil

45.1%

46.9%

58.5%

41.4%

35.2%

53.3%

52.9%

41.2%

58.3%

1.4%

0.8%

1.6%

0.3%

0.4%

0.3%

6041

1960

4058

5978

1956

3999

Notably, there are more cases pairing senior advocates against each other
than other pairings of attorneys. See Table 14.
TABLE 14. PAIRINGS OF COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT AND RESPONDENT, CIVIL
CASES
Respondent
Advocate

Senior
Advocate

Appellant
Advocate

1098
(28.5%)

659
(17.1%)

Senior
Advocate

513
(13.3%)

1582
(41.1%)

Further, in a small fraction of cases (3.9 percent) the Court appoints amicus
curie — typically a senior or otherwise well-respected lawyer, to act as a friend
of the court, and assist the Court in the matter. The Amicus does not represent
either party. S/he is supposed to assist the court in an impartial manner.
Amicus curie are generally appointed in PILs or in criminal appeals where the
defendant is represented where the Court feels the need for additional
assistance over and above what the defense lawyer can provide.

44

“Other” refers to “party in person” (i.e., pro se party) or legal aid representation.
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D. Decision Characteristics
1. Bench Size
We now turn from the characteristics of the cases to how the Court decides
them. First, we examine bench size. Nearly 90 percent of cases in our dataset
were decided by a two-judge bench, and nearly all the rest were decided by
three-judge benches. Only 91 cases out of 6856 cases in our data were decided
by a five-judge bench—and in this six-year period, there was no benches larger
than five judges. See Table 15.
TABLE 15. SUMMARY STATISTICS, BY BENCH SIZE
Bench Size
Total Cases
Share of Total
Number with PIL
Share with PIL
Share of PIL
Number with Const. Challenge
Share with Const. Challenge
Share of Const. Challenge

2

3

5

All

5971

794

91

6856

87.1%

11.6%

1.3%

100.0%

187

71

4

262

3.1%

9.0%

4.4%

3.8%

71.4%

27.1%

1.5%

100%

349

65

32

446

5.8%

8.2%

36.4%

6.5%

78.3%

14.6%

7.2%

100%

As one would expect, to the extent we see five-judge benches in the data,
they are disproportionately devoted to cases within the original jurisdiction of
the Court. While over 90 percent of decisions from two-judge benches arose out
of appeals and SLPs, only about half from five-judge benches did. See Table 16.
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TABLE 16. SUMMARY STATISTICS, CASE CATEGORIES, BY BENCH SIZE
Case Category

2

Appeal/SLP

3

5

91.4%

66.4%

56.7%

Writ Petition

5.7%

24.2%

28.9%

Other Original Jurisdiction

2.3%

8.8%

12.2%

Review or Curative

0.6%

0.5%

2.2%

Total

100%

100%

100%

More surprising is the distribution of cases involving challenges to the
constitutionality of laws or government action. Given that substantial
questions of law as to the interpretation of the constitution are required by law
to be decided by constitution benches of five or more judges,45 one would expect
cases involving challenges to the constitutionality of legislation or government
action to be concentrated in five-judge benches. However, as Table 15 shows,
more than 78% of all such questions are decided by 2 judge benches. Less than
8% of constitutional challenges are decided by benches of 5 or more. There were
even fewer cases disposed by 5 judge or more benches (0.12%) from 2005 to
2009 than in our data set.46 In contrast, in the period from 1950–1954, 15.5%
of disposed cases were by 5 or more judge benches.47 A sharp decline in bench
size occurred from the early 1960s to the late 1960s.48
A similar pattern appears for PILs. Given their broad reach, intended social
impact, and fundamental rights implications, one might expect the Court to
decide such cases in larger benches. Yet over 71% of all PILs are heard by twojudge benches.
2. Outcomes
We turn now to outcomes: how does the Court resolve the cases in our data?
Table 17 provides some data on outcomes. We find an overall reversal rate of
nearly 60 percent. The reversal rate in criminal cases (about 55 percent) is
lower than in civil cases (about 61 percent). In other work, we interpret this

45

Article 145, Constitution of India.

Nick Robinson et al., Interpreting the Constitution: Supreme Court Constitution
Benches since Independence, 46 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 27, 28 (2011).
46

47

Id.

48

Id.
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difference as reflecting a willingness of the Justices of the Court to admit
criminal appeals with weaker grounds for appeal (and therefore with a lower
probability of an eventual reversal).49 This is consistent with Justices being
more concerned about correcting errors in criminal proceedings; they may
admit borderline criminal appeals but dismiss borderline civil appeals.
TABLE 17. SUMMARY STATISTICS, INDICATOR VARIABLES
Variable

Mean

N

Reversed

59.4%

6278

Reversed, Civil Cases

61.4%

4195

Reversed, Criminal Cases

55.3%

2066

Referred to Larger Bench

1.7%

6386

Plaintiff Wins

50.0%

5632

Parties to Bear Own Costs

90.3%

2468

Interestingly, despite reversing lower court decisions in only 60% of the
cases admitted for a merits hearing, the Court, by and large, does not impose
costs on parties. In 90.3% of the cases it directs parties to bear their own costs.
Following on from the discussion about bench sizes, Table 18 presents the
success rates of PILs and constitutional challenges in the Supreme Court, by
bench size.50 Although larger benches are more willing to declare something
unconstitutional or grant relief in a PIL, benches of all sizes show willingness
to reach these conclusions.

See Aparna Chandra, William H.J. Hubbard, and Sital Kalantry, The Supreme Court
of India: A People’s Court?, 1 INDIAN L. REV. 145 (2017).
49

We code a PIL successful if the plaintiff is the prevailing party in the Supreme Court.
We code a constitutional challenge as successful if the challenged government law or
action is struck down or altered by the judgment.
50
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TABLE 18. SUMMARY STATISTICS, BY BENCH SIZE
Bench Size

2

3

5

All

Share of PILs Successful

50.0%

69.2%

100%

53.8%

Share of Const. Challenges
Successful

51.5%

55.6%

60.0%

52.7%

Share Overruling Precedent

0.9%

5.2%

19.8%

1.7%

Table 19 provides further information on constitutional challenges. The
majority of constitutional challenges are against executive action rather than
legislation or constitutional amendments. The success rate of challenges to
executive action is higher than challenges to legislation as well. Table 20
provides details of the success rates of the various types of constitutional
challenges, by bench size.
Another action that should be reserved for judgments by larger benches is
the overruling of precedent. This is because decisions of coordinate and larger
benches are binding on subsequent benches. If the judges on a subsequent
bench disagree with the ruling of a previous coordinate bench, or find
contradictory precedents from larger benches, they are required to refer the
matter to the Chief Justice of India for reference to a larger bench.51 In our
data, we coded a judgment as overruling precedent if the SCC headnote so
indicated.52 Indeed, we find that larger benches and especially five-judge
benches are much more likely to overrule precedent in the course their
decisions. See Table 18 above. Notably, though, half (56 of 115) of all
overrulings are announced by two-judge benches, in disregard of rules of
precedent.

51

Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra v. State of Maharashtra, (2005) 2 SCC 673.

The Chief Editor of the SCC informed us that the SCC headnote editors also flag
cases that impliedly overrule precedents. Such implied overrulings are therefore also
part of this data.
52
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TABLE 19. SUMMARY STATISTICS, NATURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE
Reason

Number

Number
Successful

Constitutional Amendment /
Legislation: Basic Structure

21

6

Legislation: Fundamental Rights

77

16

Legislation: Other

52

31

Executive Action: Basic Structure

12

4

224

125

55

34

441

216

Executive Action: Fundamental Rights
Executive Action: Other
Total

TABLE 20. NUMBER (NUMBER SUCCESSFUL) OF CONSTITUTIONAL
CHALLENGES, BY BENCH SIZE AND NATURE OF CHALLENGE
Bench Size

2

3

5

4
(3)

7
(1)

10
(2)

Legislation: Fundamental Rights

57
(10)

18
(4)

2
(0)

Legislation: Other

48
(29)

2
(0)

2
(2)

10
(2)

0

2
(2)

Executive Action: Fundamental Rights

183
(98)

32
(21)

9
(6)

Executive Action: Other

42
(26)

6
(4)

7
(4)

344
(168)

65
(30)

32
(16)

Const. Amend./Legislation: Basic Structure

Executive Action: Basic Structure

Total

We also find variation in the reversal rates of different high courts and
other courts and tribunals from which the cases originated. Table 21 ranks the
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high courts, tribunals, and special courts by their reversal rates. Most rates
are in a band roughly around the overall reversal rate of about 59 percent.
Although there are some outliers far from the average, we advise caution in
interpreting the outlier values, as many of them involve courts with relatively
small numbers of cases (there are only 8 cases from the High Court of Sikkim,
for example), and thus the difference may be due to variation arising from
small sample sizes.
TABLE 21. REVERSAL RATE: ADJUDICATORY BODY APPEALED FROM
High Court
High Court of Sikkim
High Court of Orissa
High Court of Jharkhand
High Court of Chhattisgarh
High Court of Madhya Pradesh
High Court of Patna
High Court of Uttarakhand
High Court of Punjab & Haryana
High Court of Rajasthan
Special Court
High Court of Gujarat
High Court of Karnataka
High Court of Madras
High Court of Calcutta
High Court of Andhra Pradesh
High Court of Himachal Pradesh
High Court of Bombay
High Court of Delhi
High Court of Allahabad
High Court of Gauhati
Tribunal
High Court of Kerala
High Court of Jammu & Kashmir
High Court of Meghalaya
Total

Reversal Rate
75.0%
73.3%
65.1%
64.8%
64.1%
64.0%
62.7%
62.3%
62.1%
61.5%
61.3%
60.9%
59.9%
59.7%
59.2%
56.2%
55.7%
54.7%
54.4%
53.9%
50.3%
49.1%
43.6%
0.0%
58.5%

Number53
8
94
88
56
289
171
121
646
262
13
198
367
368
261
301
73
607
530
502
91
254
233
39
1
5573

Our data also shows that individual, government and institutional
appellants are likely to win at roughly the same rates. See Table 22.

53

Number of cases includes cases for which information on reversal is missing.
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TABLE 22. APPELLANT WIN RATES, BY PARTY STATUS
Appellant Status

Win Rate

Number

Individual

58.0%

3728

Government

61.2%

1277

Institution

61.4%

1261

Total

59.3%

6266

Finally, we studied whether concurring judgments by lower courts (i.e., the
courts of first and second instance reached the same outcome) would have an
impact on the reversal rate before the Supreme Court. We find, as expected,
that the Supreme Court is more likely to reverse a decision when lower courts
disagree on the outcome, than when the lower courts agree.
TABLE 23: REVERSAL RATE, BY LOWER COURT AGREEMENT
Outcomes in lower
courts/tribunals

Agreement

Disagreement

N

Criminal Appeals from High
Courts

49.8%

58.0%

1384

Civil Appeals from High Courts

60.3%

63.7%

1142

Civil Appeals from Appellate
Tribunals

59.6%

73.8%

600

E. Opinion Characteristics
We conclude the survey of our data on the Court with a look at the
judgments themselves—the opinions that are the work product of the justices
of the Court. The first thing to note is that the Supreme Court of India is
prolific! It produces nearly a thousand opinions per year. As these opinions
average almost 9 pages in length, the Court generates over 8000 pages of new
law for the bench and bar to digest each year.54 See Table 24.

Data in prior sections was organized by judgment—each case decided by the Court
is treated as separate, even if two cases were decided in a single opinion. In this section,
54

26
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3154597

TABLE 24. TOTAL JUDGMENT LENGTH
Variable

Mean

Median

Max

Min

N

No. of Pages in Opinion

8.7

6

268

1

5547

No. of Pages in Opinion,
Const. Challenge Cases

17.9

11

268

1

269

Nearly all of this output takes the form of unanimous judgments. Most
opinions take the familiar form of an opinion authored by a single justice (what
we are calling “signed opinions”), although a large share of opinions are per
curiam (i.e., not attributed to a specific justice). Separate opinions, whether
concurring or dissenting, are extremely rare. See Table 25. Even five-judge
benches, which presumably hear the most difficult and contentious cases,
produce a separate opinion (dissenting or concurring) barely 10 percent of the
time.
TABLE 25. AUTHORSHIP SUMMARY STATISTICS, BY BENCH SIZE
Bench Size
Share with Signed Opinion

2

3

5

All

74.4%

61.9%

80.7%

73.2%

Share with Concurrence

0.8%

2.7%

5.3%

1.0%

Share with Dissent

0.3%

1.4%

5.3%

0.5%

Among signed opinions, opinion-writing duties do not fall evenly among
justices. Table 26 lists the judges in our data, with the total number of opinions
of the court (as opposed to concurring opinions or dissenting opinions) each
justice has authored and the total number of cases in which each justice has
participated.55 The number of opinions authored by justice varies widely (from
none to 236). This is largely due to variation in the number of cases decided by
the justices, of course, but there is also substantial variation in how often a
justice writes after hearing a case. In Table 26, we use bold typeface to mark
the three highest rates (Banumathi, Kabir, and Sirpurkar, JJ.) and three
lowest rates (Joseph, Agrawal, and Misra, JJ.) of opinion writing as a percent

we treat opinions, rather than judgments as the unit of analysis. Thus, if a judge writes
a single opinion deciding two consolidated cases, we treat that as a single observation.
The “other” justices not separately listed are Justices Arijit Pasayat, B.N. Kirpal,
Y.K. Sabharwal, G.B. Pattanaik, and V. Ramaswami, each of whom served during only
a tiny segment of our sample period and thus are not well represented in the data.
55
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of all cases in which the justice participates. Justice Banumathi writes the
opinion of the court nearly two-thirds (64.4 percent) of the time she participates
in the case; Justice Joseph did so less than one-in-twenty times (4.4 percent).56
TABLE 26. OPINION AUTHORSHIP: OPINIONS OF THE COURT
Justice
B.S. Chauhan
P. Sathasivam
G.S. Singhvi
K.S.P. Radhakrishnan
T.S. Thakur
Dipak Misra
Altamas Kabir
R.M. Lodha
R.V. Raveendran
A.K. Patnaik
Swatanter Kumar
S.J. Mukhopadhaya
Ranjan Gogoi
A.K. Ganguly
Aftab Alam
A.K. Sikri
V. Gopala Gowda
Mukundakam Sharma
C.K. Prasad
Anil R. Dave
S.S. Nijjar
Ranjana Prakash Desai
D.K. Jain
M.Y. Eqbal
H.L. Dattu
F.M.I. Kalifulla
H.L. Gokhale
J.S. Khehar
V.S. Sirpurkar
Dalveer Bhandari

Opinions of
the court
236
227
184
178
176
167
160
151
139
133
112
111
100
96
95
95
95
89
86
85
83
78
75
75
72
68
61
61
56
53

Total Cases

Rate

495
511
494
450
403
438
252
348
295
397
300
307
253
246
299
239
231
201
337
364
288
204
170
160
373
212
244
176
98
193

47.7%
44.4%
37.2%
39.6%
43.7%
38.1%
63.5%
43.4%
47.1%
33.5%
37.3%
36.2%
39.5%
39.0%
31.8%
39.7%
41.1%
44.3%
25.5%
23.4%
28.8%
38.2%
44.1%
46.9%
19.3%
32.1%
25.0%
34.7%
57.1%
27.5%

For purposes of identifying outliers in opinion-writing rates, we focus only on judges
who have participated in at least 25 judgments. Justices who have heard only a
handful of cases, of course, may have very high or very low rates simply due to small
sample size, so to speak.
56
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TABLE 26. OPINION AUTHORSHIP: OPINIONS OF THE COURT (CONT.)
Justice
Madan B. Lokur
R. Banumathi
Kurian Joseph
Jasti Chelameswar
Vikramajit Sen
S.H. Kapadia
J.M. Panchal
Markandey Katju
Chockalingam Nagappan
P.C. Ghose
H.S. Bedi
Gyan Sudha Misra
B. Sudershan Reddy
Adarsh Kumar Goel
Prafulla C. Pant
Shiva Kirti Singh
N.V. Ramana
Rohinton Fali Nariman
Deepak Verma
U.U. Lalit
Abhay Manohar Sapre
S.A. Bobde
Tarun Chatterjee
K.G. Balakrishnan
Arun Mishra
Amitava Roy
Cyriac Joseph
R.K. Agrawal
5 others
Total

Opinions of
the court
49
47
45
44
43
37
37
36
36
36
35
34
31
31
28
27
26
24
23
20
20
17
11
10
9
9
5
2
3
4172

Total Cases

Rate

187
73
124
219
139
225
110
152
134
110
174
267
107
64
59
91
92
69
164
51
50
122
21
74
37
22
113
38
7
12073

26.2%
64.4%
36.3%
20.1%
30.9%
16.4%
33.6%
23.7%
26.9%
32.7%
20.1%
12.7%
29.0%
48.4%
47.5%
29.7%
28.3%
34.8%
14.0%
39.2%
40.0%
13.9%
52.4%
13.5%
24.3%
40.9%
4.4%
5.3%
42.9%
34.6%

As noted above, concurrences and dissents are exceedingly rare in our data.
The few separate opinions we do find are largely the product of a minority of
justices. As Table 27 indicates, only 10 justices have authored more than one
concurring opinion in our data; 37 have authored zero. But even among those
justices most likely to write a concurring opinion (Lokur, Chelameswar, and
Thakur, JJ.), they do so rarely.
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TABLE 27. OPINION AUTHORSHIP: CONCURRING OPINIONS
Justice
Madan B. Lokur
T.S. Thakur
Jasti Chelameswar
K.S.P. Radhakrishnan
Dipak Misra
C.K. Prasad
Altamas Kabir
A.K. Ganguly
Gyan Sudha Misra
A.K. Sikri
G.S. Singhvi
R.M. Lodha
Swatanter Kumar
Aftab Alam
Mukundakam Sharma
Ranjana Prakash Desai
F.M.I. Kalifulla
H.L. Gokhale
J.S. Khehar
R. Banumathi
Kurian Joseph
Vikramajit Sen
S.H. Kapadia
B. Sudershan Reddy
Rohinton Fali Nariman
Cyriac Joseph
37 others
Total

Concurring
Opinions
8
6
5
4
4
4
3
3
3
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
58

Total Cases

Rate

187
403
219
450
438
337
252
246
267
239
494
348
300
299
201
204
212
244
176
73
124
139
225
107
69
113
5707
12073

4.3%
1.5%
2.3%
0.9%
0.9%
1.2%
1.2%
1.2%
1.1%
0.8%
0.2%
0.3%
0.3%
0.3%
0.5%
0.5%
0.5%
0.4%
0.6%
1.4%
0.8%
0.7%
0.4%
0.9%
1.4%
0.9%
0%
0.4%

So too with dissenting opinions. Table 28 reveals that only 5 justices have
authored more than one dissenting opinion in our data; 46 have authored zero.
Interestingly, the three justices who write dissents at the highest rate
(Banumathi, Misra, and Chelameswar, JJ.) are familiar from the tables above,
as well. When considering the prospects for the Supreme Court of India to
serve as a catalyst for social change, it may be worth contemplating whether
the extremely low rates of concurring and dissenting opinions indicate a norm
of agreement, or perhaps even conformity, within the Court. If so, a norm of
agreement might empower the Court to speak in a united way when making
bold pronouncement, or it may prevent the Court from taking bold steps in the
first place.
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TABLE 28. OPINION AUTHORSHIP: DISSENTING OPINIONS
Justice

Dissenting
opinions

Gyan Sudha Misra
Jasti Chelameswar
V. Gopala Gowda
H.L. Gokhale
R. Banumathi
P. Sathasivam
K.S.P. Radhakrishnan
Altamas Kabir
A.K. Patnaik
Ranjan Gogoi
Aftab Alam
Anil R. Dave
S.S. Nijjar
F.M.I. Kalifulla
V.S. Sirpurkar
Dalveer Bhandari
H.S. Bedi
46 others
Total

Total Cases

6
4
3
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
29

Rate

267
219
231
244
73
511
450
252
397
253
299
364
288
212
98
193
174
7548
12073

2.2%
1.8%
1.3%
0.8%
2.7%
0.2%
0.2%
0.4%
0.3%
0.4%
0.3%
0.3%
0.3%
0.5%
1.0%
0.5%
0.6%
0%
0.2%

V. CONCLUSION
In this chapter, we present a wide range of findings from our analysis of
the largest, most detailed dataset of Supreme Court of India judgments ever
constructed. These findings should help establish basic facts about the Court
that can inform and perhaps provoke future research.
Evaluating the potential of the Supreme Court of India to instantiate social
change requires identifying the current capabilities and limitations of its
current practices. In this respect, our chapter has identified many facts about
the Court that may be relevant. Here, we will simply note a few of them and
offer some speculations about their relevance for the larger project of
understanding how the Court functions and which directions for potential
reform are the most promising.
First, the large number of cases decided by the Court, large number of
criminal cases, and large number of cases involving individual appellants, are
consistent with the Court’s oft-stated self-conception as a “people’s court”
determined to provide broad access to litigants. Yet handling the crush of
thousands of routine cases surely detracts from the time and energy that the
Court can devote to high-profile cases or the elaboration of broad rules to
govern Indian society. There are clearly trade-offs here. One way that the
Court has created a greater capacity to hear large numbers of cases has been
its increasing reliance on two-judge benches, to the point in our study period,
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nearly 90% of cases are being decided by only two judges. Yet decisions
overruling existing precedent are required to be heard by benches of three or
more judges and important constitutional challenges by benches of five or more
(although, as we observed, this rule appears to be honored in the breach). The
Court’s ability to speak with a unified voice (or at least to speak in groups
larger than two) on questions of jurisprudential or constitutional import
suffers as the resources of the Court are spread thinner and thinner to hear
more and more cases. Thus, a crucial question is whether the Court would
benefit from striking a different balance. In other work,57 we explore this
question further.
Second and closely related, we see that public interest litigations constitute
less than 4% (262 of 6856) of the cases in our data, and most PILs are handled
by two-judge benches. Yet PILs are the consummate legal actions for
promoting progressive social change. Do the small numbers relative to the
whole belie a disproportionate impact (and disproportionate effort and
attention from the Court)? Or does this call for a reassessment of the Court’s
commitment to PILs? Our data alone cannot answer these questions.
Third, while our focus and the focus of this volume is on the role of the
Court, our data raises questions about the role of attorneys in setting India’s
agenda for social change. Accounts of the influence of so-called “grand
advocates” abound.58 Is there a way to see whether they affect the outcomes of
cases? Preliminary work by Vidhi suggests that the most certainly do.59 If elite
advocates have substantial influence over which cases the Court exercises its

See Aparna Chandra, William H.J. Hubbard, and Sital Kalantry, The Supreme Court
of India: A People’s Court?, 1 INDIAN L. REV. 145 (2017).
57

Robinson and Galanter describe an even smaller group of lawyers in the top echelon
of the Indian legal profession whom they dub “Grand Advocates.” Marc Galanter and
Nick Robinson, India’s Grand Advocates: A Legal Elite Flourishing in the Era of
Globalization 2 & 11 (HLS Program on the Legal Professional Research Paper No.
2013-5, 2013). These elite lawyers charge eye-popping fees ($10,000 for a few minutes
of argument) and represent only the “uber-rich, major multinational corporations, and
the country’s political class.” Id. Robinson and Galanter further argue that the that
“the presence of so many benches, and the resulting pervasive (though mild)
indeterminacy of precedent, increases the chances that representation by a grand
advocate may make a difference in outcome. At least it is perceived to possibly make a
difference by significant numbers of clients with deep pockets engaged in controversies
where the stakes make irrelevant the size of legal fees.” Id. at 9.
58

Amok Prasanna Kumar, The True Worth of a Senior Advocate: Senior Counsels Seem
to Wield Disproportionate Influence on How the Supreme Court of India Exercises its
Jurisdiction, LIVE MINT (Sept. 16, 2015). Vidhi randomly selected 378 SLPs out of the
34,500 civil SLPs filed in 2014 where there was a lawyer appearing only for the
petitioner. They found that a senior advocate appeared in 38% of the cases and notice
was issued in 60% of those cases. When a non-senior advocate appeared, the success
rate was 33%. On the other hand, the average odds of success for civil SLPs are under
44%
59
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discretion to hear, this raises the question of the agenda-setting power of
advocates vis-à-vis the Court itself.
Fourth, the data on case duration suggests that delays in adjudication are
substantial in the Supreme Court and are distributed throughout the appellate
hierarchy as well. Many questions remain: How long are the delays faced by
the cases that aren’t in our data, which are pending but not yet decided? At
what levels of the court system can delays be most easily remedied? How are
delays affecting the delivery of justice? Most importantly for the agenda of this
book, how does pervasive delay affect the ability of the Indian Courts to deliver
aid to the disadvantaged or instantiate legal and social change? Delay, by its
very nature, preserves the status quo.
Surely, there are countless more questions that we have not even
identified. Our hope is that the data we have presented here will provide a
starting point for research that identifies, and ultimately answers, these
questions.
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